Damages granted by the State and their relation to State aid law by Tjepkema, M.K.G.
478 EStAL 3|2013Damages Granted by the State and their Relation to State Aid Law
Damages Granted by the State and their Relation 
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Michiel Tjepkema*
This article deals with compensations granted by government and their relation to State aid law. 
It focuses on compensations that can be dealt with under Article 107(2)(b) and 107(3)(c) and 
which, as a rule, are granted after damage was caused by acts outside of government control, 
such as floods, earthquakes, and industrial accidents. The article discusses several criteria used 
by the courts to test compensations applicable under the State aid rules. Second, the article 
discusses situations where government can be held liable in court, since unlawful or even lawful 
actions of public authorities caused the damage. In those cases, the Asteris case law rules the 
compatibility of compensations with State aid rules. According to this case law, legally obliged 
compensations are ‘fundamentally different’ in nature from State aid. This case law is discussed, 
and a few general rules distilled from it. By discussing examples from the European Commission 
practice, recent case law from the GC (the ThyssenKrupp case) and national compensation 
regimes, I will point out that the line between State aid and compensation is not always easy 
to define. The risk of granting unlawful State aid is certainly present in cases of liability in the 
absence of fault, which liability is dependent on criteria that are surrounded by vagueness, such 
as the ‘normal business risk’ of an undertaking.
I. Introduction
The subject of this article is the relation between 
EU State aid law and damages paid by national au-
thorities.1 This subject has not been given much at-
tention in State aid literature. This does not mean 
that this subject has no practical and theoretical 
importance. In fact, the Commission is frequently 
confronted with government compensations and has 
to test their compatibility with the State aid rules. 
One example, which will be discussed later on, is the 
large sums of money which are spent on compensat-
ing farmers who somehow suffer from (legitimate) 
measures combating contagious diseases. Member 
States granted damages in many other situations 
as well, however. Sometimes, these payments find 
their ground in a legal obligation, such as liability in 
tort, infringement to the right to property (expropri-
ations), or default. On a regular basis, governments 
spend large sums of money in situations where they 
have not acted unlawfully.2 Even then, in the absence 
of fault, a legal obligation to compensate can exist, 
namely when government has breached the principle 
of égalité devant les charges publiques (equality be-
fore the public burdens). This principle states that the 
disproportionate adverse consequences of a lawful 
action of public authorities should not burden a rela-
tively small group of citizens, but should be borne by 
society as a whole, since the harmful act was in the 
general interest.3 Further, governments regularly pay 
large sums of money by their own will, even where 
there is no legal obligation to do so. Such ex gratia 
payments can be a part of government policy and are 
granted when government does not want to admit it 
can be held liable. In England, for example, ex gratia 
* Dr. M. K. G. Tjepkema is Assistant Professor at the Department of 
Constitutional and Administrative Law at Leiden University. He 
would like to thank Prof. W. den Ouden and Dr. P. C. Adriaanse 
for their valuable comment on an earlier draft. 
1 This article therefore does not deal with the question of 
competitors claiming damages in cases of unlawfully granted 
State aid. See on this subject Honoré and Eram Jensen, Damages 
in State Aid Cases, EStAL, 2011, 2, p. 265 et seq. 
2 In the Netherlands for example, public authorities spend as much 
or even more money on liability without fault than on tort based 
liability. In the case of airport Schiphol for example, government 
spent up to Ź 30 million to residents whose houses have been 
depreciated after lawful measures relating to the functioning of 
the airport (e.g. decisions involving noise restrictions or spatial 
acts).
3 In France, this type of liability is recognized for almost all lawful 
government acts: not only decisions, but also non-legal acts (road 
repair for example), and laws adopted by parliament. Other legal 
systems also recognize the equality principle (e.g. Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal).
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payments are a large part of the compensations the 
government pays to individuals.4 
When the granting of damages is strictly based on 
the general legal principles, a State aid problem will 
not arise, as I will explain in part III. Liability based 
on fault, in particular, does not mean that an ‘advan-
tage’ is given to an undertaking; liability ensures that 
a damaged party is given what it is entitled to. Since 
the legal principles governing liability apply to every 
undertaking in the same way, it is also hard to claim 
that the application of a legal principle in a concrete 
case can be considered as ‘selective’. Yet, public au-
thorities sometimes make special ‘arrangements’ for 
the granting of damages. These are, as a rule, laid 
down in a regulation which applies to a special group 
of undertakings. At least in those cases, a State aid 
problem can indeed arise. In those cases, it turns out 
that government payments easily meet the State aid 
criteria, as they are provided by State resources.5 Fur-
thermore, the Commission tends to readily assume 
that compensation provides a company with an ad-
vantage: it suffices that the contribution provides 
them with an advantage that they would normally 
not have had and would normally bear themselves.6 
The condition of selectivity then normally does not 
pose a problem either: when a contribution is granted 
to a group of companies with a particular characteris-
tic, the Commission, as a rule, will conclude that the 
advantage is selective, since this group then takes 
a special position compared with other comparable 
companies.7 Lastly, when the undertaking carries out 
its activities in an international market, it will be as-
sumed that the compensation might affect the trade 
between Member States, and, therefore, it might be 
incompatible with the common market. 
In light of the similarities between compensations 
and State aid, there are many instances where the 
tension between the payment of damages and State 
aid law is tangible.8 This has prompted the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs to write a manual that 
civil servants can use when taking decisions on com-
pensations and when they are in doubt of granting 
State aid.9 The fact is that even when public authori-
ties claim they are, from a national law perspective, 
legally obliged to grant compensation, there might 
be the risk of de facto granting unlawful State aid 
from an EU law perspective. This article hopes to 
shed light on this subject, which balances on the 
fine line between law and policy. Part II deals with 
the question of what the TFEU currently says on 
government compensations and the conditions that 
must be fulfilled to be compatible with State aid law. 
This concerns mainly cases where the damage is not 
(directly) caused by government action but has an 
exterior cause; sometimes, these payments are held 
compatible with the State aid rules since one of the 
exceptions of either Art. 107 (2)(b) or 107 (3)(c) apply. 
It is important to distinguish these cases from the sit-
uations dealt with in Part III and IV, where the dam-
age is caused by (unlawful or even lawful) govern-
ment action. The framework the Commission uses 
to test the compensations’ compatibility with State 
aid law differs in both cases. The criteria used by the 
Commission and the Union Courts to test measures 
in both cases are discussed in Part III. Finally, Part 
IV deals with the question of whether mandatory 
compensations can come within the borders of the 
State aid rules. Two criteria are discussed that can 
4 For a recent discussion, see Harlow, Rationalizing administrative 
compensation, Public Law, 2010, p. 321-339.
5 This is also the case when the compensation is not provided 
directly by the State, but goes first to an insurance company, 
which uses the money to compensate the companies concerned: 
Commission Decision of 15 October 2003, C(2003) 3551fin. Even 
the proceeds of para-fiscal levies, which ask an undertaking to 
deposit money in a fund, can be qualified as ‘State resources’ 
(Case C-345/02, Pearle [2004] ECR I-7139).
6 For example, companies normally have to bear the costs of 
having to vaccinate animals themselves. Likewise, they have to 
bear the damage caused by bad weather conditions. When 
government intervenes and decides to carry the burdens that a 
company normally has to carry itself, this is clearly advantageous. 
The exact extent of compensation is not decisive aid to be 
regarded as beneficial. Both when the measure is designed for all 
damage (Commission Decision of 6 December 2002 concerning 
a one-off compensation of 100 % of the losses of beeches caused 
by bark beetles, C(2002) 4849) or only a portion thereof 
(Commission Decision of 4 July 2003, concerning a compensation 
of 15 % of the remediation costs in order to sanitize a former 
gasworks site, C(2003) 2374), can it be ‘beneficial’.
7 The exact size of the group will not be the point of most concern: 
the selectiveness criterion was met in cases where a relatively 
limited group profited from a contribution (only poultry farmers, 
for example, Commission Decision of 4 August 2005, C(2005) 
3113), but was also met in cases where large groups of companies 
(all agricultural companies, for example; see Commission 
Decision of 15 October 2003 concerning a subsidy for new 
agricultural assurances, C(2003) 3551fin). See for an application 
of the selectiveness test also the decision in the Thyssen Krupp-
case, para. 100 (to be discussed in part. IV). 
8 A recent example in Dutch law concerns the plans of government 
to prohibit the breeding of minks for their pelts. One reason for 
not compensating the breeders financially (but offering them a 
large transition period instead) is the fear of unfairly favouring 
Dutch breeders over other European breeders. See Kamerstukken 
II 2007/08, 30 826, nr. 6, p. 3-4.
9 The Guidance on State aid law and damage compensation 
(Handreiking nadeelcompensatie en staatssteun) published in 
2007 by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
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function as indicators of the ‘instrumental’ use of 
compensation mechanisms.
II.  The Regulations on the 
Compensation of Damages 
Enshrined in Article 107(2)(b) ...
First of all, it should be noted that where the aid 
does not surpass the amounts set in the ‘de mini-
mis’ regulation, there is no risk of granting State aid. 
This means that aid not exceeding a ceiling of € 200 
000 over any period of three years does not affect 
trade between Member States and does not distort 
or threaten to distort competition and therefore 
does not fall under the scope of Art. 107 (1) TFEU. 
The amounts which are exempted are much lower 
in some fields however, such as the agriculture and 
fisheries sectors.10 
When a compensation surpasses the de minimis 
threshold, it might still be compatible with State aid 
rules, namely when one of the exceptions of Article 
107 applies. The Treaty offers a special set of rules for 
compensations that serve to compensate for the dam-
age caused by natural disasters or exceptional occur-
rences (Article 107(2)(b)) and for the aid provided to 
facilitate the development of certain economic activ-
ities or of certain economic areas (Article 107(3)(c)).11 
In this paragraph, I want to show the criteria the 
Commission, the ECJ, and the GC use to test govern-
ment compensations against their compatibility with 
the internal market under these articles. It should 
be noted that the Commission has plans to exempt 
certain categories of aid from prior notification to the 
Commission, such as aid for compensating damages 
caused by natural disasters and aid to compensate 
the damage caused by adverse weather conditions 
in fisheries. One of the reasons to allow for block 
exemptions in these fields is that the Commission 
has acquired significant practical experience in re-
cent years with regard to these categories of State 
aid.12 The compatibility criteria used with regard to 
natural disasters and exceptional occurrences will 
now be discussed.
1.  Compensations in Relation to Natural 
Disasters and Exceptional Occurrences
The Commission and the ECJ have repeatedly 
stressed that Article 107(2)(b) TFEU should be inter-
preted restrictively.13 So far, the Commission has ac-
cepted that earthquakes, avalanches, landslides, and 
floods may constitute natural disasters. As the Treaty 
does not define those occurrences that might qualify 
as ‘exceptional’, the Commission assesses the applica-
bility of this provision on a case-by-case basis.14 The 
Commission has stated, however, that the exceptional 
occurrence, because of its nature and consequences, 
must constitute a clear break with respect to the usu-
al course of business of the companies in question; 
the occurrence (and its consequences) should not be-
long to the normal operation of the market.15
So far, the Commission has accepted the following 
exceptional occurrences: war, internal disturbances 
or strikes, and with certain reservations and de-
pending on their extent, major nuclear or industrial 
accidents and fires that result in widespread loss.16 
As to the nature of the occurrence, the Commission 
has stated that it should be unpredictable and thus 
unforeseeable.17 The rationale is that undertakings 
can take precautionary measures against occurrences 
that are foreseeable to limit their damage. For ex-
ample, a strike on Italian highways was not quali-
10 See for details: Commission regulation (EC) No 1860/2004 on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis 
aid in the agriculture and fisheries sectors, OJ 2004 L 325/4.
11 On the subject of these exemptions, see also: L. Hancher, T. 
Ottervanger & P. J. Slot, EU State Aids (Sweet & Maxwell 2012), 
p. 142-143 and 158-160.
12 MEMO/12/936, 5 December 2012.
13 Commission Decision of 7 May 2004, OJ 2005 L 110/48-55 
(Spanish olive producers) and Commission Decision of 20 
September 2000, OJ 2001 L 35/39 (Aid after Italian natural 
disasters; para. 31). See also Commission Decision of 13 June 
2000, OJ 2000 L 263/17 (Transport of Irish cattle). See also Case 
C-278/00, Greece v. Commission [2004] ECR I-3997, para. 81 
and Case C-73/03 [2004] ECR n.y.r., Spain/Commission, paras. 
37 et seq.
14 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/c 319/01), para. 122.
15 Commission Decision 29 July 1999 concerning the Belgian dioxin 
crisis, No sub 2.1 (Belgian dioxin crisis). See also Commission 
Decision concerning special measures relating to a dioxin 
contamination in Ireland, Aid No NN 44/2009 (ex N 435/2009): 
‘[I]n order to be able to categorise an event as an exceptional 
occurrence, the said event has to distinguish itself clearly from 
the ordinary by its character and by its effects on the affected 
undertakings and therefore has to lie outside of the normal 
functioning of the market.’
16 See also the Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture 
and forestry sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/C 319/01).
17 Commission Decision of 3 April 2002, OJ 2002 L 194/37-44 
(Italian olive producers; para. 36) and Commission Decision of 7 
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fied as ‘exceptional’, since strikes occur regularly.18 
Drought, even on a large scale, has also never been 
recognised as a natural disaster within the meaning 
of Art. 107(2)(b) TFEU.19 
As to the extent of the damages, it is hard to draw 
a clear line, so I will limit myself to some examples. 
The Commission found that the bursting of a huge 
reservoir filled with toxic sludge in Hungary was 
exceptional, since this caused about ten deaths and 
enormous ecological and economic damage to the 
region.20 On the other hand, the Commission will not 
accept that a fire at a single processing plant covered 
by normal commercial insurance could be considered 
as an exceptional occurrence.21 Fires causing wide-
spread losses, however, have been held compatible 
with the internal market when they qualified as a 
‘natural disaster’.22 By focusing on the nature and the 
extent of the damage, the Commission thus allows 
itself a flexible interpretation of the question as to 
whether an occurrence qualifies as a ‘natural disaster’ 
or as ‘exceptional’: even a common cause of damage, 
such as an outbreak of disease among animals, which 
normally does not qualify as a natural disaster or as 
an exceptional occurrence, can be exceptional, name-
ly when this leads to the total closure of the export 
markets for meat coming from the European Union 
and the general reluctance among European consum-
ers to eat that meat.23 Furthermore, the Commission 
has stated that contagious diseases among animals 
and plants can be ‘exceptional occurrences’ if these 
diseases appear for the first time and lead to wide-
spread losses.24
When an occurrence is dealt with under the clause 
of Article 107(2)(b), the Commission sometimes re-
fers to their guidelines. In cases concerning damages, 
an important guideline is the Community Guidelines 
for State Aid in the Agriculture and Forestry Sector 
2007–2013 (2006/C 319/01).25 Among other things, 
this guideline states the conditions under which gov-
ernments can provide for contributions to farmers 
who suffer losses as a result of measures that aim to 
root out animal diseases. These guidelines offer lit-
tle information about the conditions that compensa-
tions have to meet to be compatible with the internal 
market. A study of the decisions of the Commission 
offers important additional information on the rele-
vant criteria.
a. Direct causal link
A criterion mentioned in many decisions is the caus-
al link: there must be a direct link between the aid 
granted and the event that caused the damage.26 
There should be a ‘direct’ or a ‘necessary and exclu-
sive causal link’,27 or at least a ‘clear and direct link’.28 
Whatever the exact words, they make clear that the 
Commission imposes stringent requirements on the 
causal link between the event that caused the dam-
age and the State aid intended to remedy it. When the 
Commission is in doubt, it is up to the Member State 
to prove that the aid is justified. The State will then 
have to submit material regarding which damage was 
compensated and how the size of the aid and the 
group of recipients were determined. As to the extent 
of the damage, the Commission has stated that the 
aid granted should correspond to the damage suppos-
edly inflicted upon the recipients.29 Therefore, the 
Commission had its doubts about an aiding mecha-
nism that did not relate to the actual damage but to 
the volume of investments carried out during a cer-
tain period, the volume of investments in preceding 
years, and the existence of a taxable income. Even if 
the recipient might have suffered damage caused by 
the natural disasters at issue, it could not be excluded 
18 Commission Decision of 7 May 2004, OJ 2006 L 257/1-10 (Strikes 
of Sicilian road transporters, para. 56: ‘Strikes can be a frequent 
event and, if there is advance notice, suitable precautions may be 
taken. The element of unforeseeability is therefore missing in this 
case.’).
19 Commission Decision of 16 July 2008, OJ L 244/17 (Aid to the 
Villasor sugar refinery), para 63.
20 Commission Decision of 28 June 2011, C(2011) 4681 concerning 
the red sludge Ajka Alumina Plant, para. 27.
21 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/C 319/01), para. 122.
22 Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 concerning aid to 
compensate for the damages caused by the fire to Palmitos Park, 
N 622/2008.
23 Commission Decision of 12 March 2002 concerning aid to cattle 
holding companies in Nordrhein-Westfalen, C(2002) 906fin.
24 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/C 319/01), para. 122.
25 2006/C 319/1, paras. 120-123.
26 Case C-346 and C-529/03, Atzeni e. a. t. Regione autonoma della 
Sordegna [2006] ECR 1-1975, para. 79 and Judgment of 11 
November 2004, Case C-73/03, Spain v. Commission [2004], 
n.y.r., para. 37.
27 Commission Decision of 7 May 2004, OJ L 257, p. 1-10, 2006 
(Strikes Sicilian road transporters; para. 61).
28 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 on the aid scheme 
implemented by Italy for firms investing in municipalities seriously 
affected by natural disasters in 2002 (notified under document 
number C(2004) 3893; paras. 45 et seq.).
29 Case C-278/00, Greece v. Commission [2004] ECR I-3997; 
para. 89.
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that the amount of aid would exceed the amount of 
damage.30
When determining the causal link, the group of 
recipients receiving the aid also has to be taken into 
account. After all, when aid is given to undertakings 
that did not suffer any damage, this is a sign that 
the aid is not (only) compensatory in character, but 
also gives support to undertakings for other types of 
hardship. The aiding scheme should not have a very 
wide scope but should aim at specifically compensat-
ing those who suffered damage. This is not the case 
when the aiding scheme makes it possible to settle all 
kinds of debts incurred by agricultural cooperatives, 
provided they relate to social purposes, and if the 
scheme can be applied to very diverse situations.31
Lastly, the demand of a sufficiently direct caus-
al link has a temporary element. Where aid is paid 
only several years after the occurrence of the event 
in question, there is a real risk that the payment of 
such aid will produce the same economic effects as 
operating aid. Therefore, in the absence of a specific 
justification, for example, resulting from the nature 
and extent of the event or the delayed or continuing 
nature of the damage, the Commission does not ap-
prove national aid that is submitted more than three 
years after the occurrence.32
b.  Prohibition of accumulation of different 
financial means covering the same damage
A second issue relates to the risk of overcompensa-
tion. Its importance could be illustrated by the fact 
that the ECJ stated repeatedly that not only the rela-
tively small size of the aid measure was decisive for 
its compatibility with the internal market, but other 
issues had to be examined, ‘such as whether the aid 
is cumulative and whether the undertakings that re-
ceive it are operating in a sector that is particularly 
exposed to competition’.33
Accumulation takes place when more than one 
aiding measure covers the same costs or damages.34 
When aid is given in relation to a natural disaster 
that constitutes an exceptional occurrence, accumu-
lation might occur when the damaged undertaking 
also receives aid through other, already approved aid-
ing measures35 or through social or insurance pay-
ments.36 To prevent overcompensation, these other 
aid measures have to be deducted from the aid.37 If 
the risk of accumulation arises, the Member State 
will have to make clear how this effect will be pre-
vented.
c.  Objective and individual assessment  
of the damage
The Member State has to show that the damage for 
which compensation is given is assessed in an objec-
tive and individual manner. As to objectiveness, the 
Commission is more likely to conclude that an aid 
measure is compatible with the internal market when 
independent experts have assessed the damages.38 
Furthermore, damages, as a rule, should be assessed 
at the level of the individual undertaking and not at 
the macroeconomic level or on the basis of the aver-
age damage of several companies. This requirement 
has strong ties with the demand for a clear causal 
link. When the damage is not quantified at the level 
of each firm, but at the macroeconomic level (which 
is usually done for reasons of speed and/or efficien-
cy, since an individual assessment takes time), it is 
harder to determine whether the aid is aimed at only 
30 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004, OJ 2005 L 100/46 
(Natural disasters Italy 2002; para. 48).
31 C-278/00, Greece v. Commission [2004] ECR I-3997, para. 85. 
See also Opinion of AG Geelhoed in the same case, para. 57.
32 Commission Decision of 1 March 2000, OJ 2002 L 159/1 (Debts 
of Greeks agricultural cooperatives; para. 142), Commission 
Decision of 25 July 1990, OJ 1991 L 86/ 23-27 (Aid scheme 
Mezzogiorno; sub IV) and Commission Decision of 20 September 
2000, OJ 2001 L 35/39 (Natural disasters Italy 1990-1997; 
para. 35 e.v.).
33 Case C-278/00, Greece v. Commission [2004] ECR I-3997, 
para. 70; Case C-113/00, Spain v. Commission [2002] ECR I-7631, 
para. 30.
34 Europese regelgeving over staatssteun. Informatiewijzer voor de 
decentrale overheid. : Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2004, p. 20 (‘European rules on State Aid. 
Information brochure for municipalities and provinces’; The 
Hague 2004).
35 Commission Decision of 9 February 2000, SG(2000), D 101388 
on aid measure N 770/99 (Belgian dioxin crisis), p. 11.
36 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/c 319/01), para. 123. According to the 
Commission, the risk of accumulation is especially present in the 
field of agriculture, where farmers often receive aid from different 
sources (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006, OJ 2006 L 
358/6).
37 See, for example, Commission Decision 7 May 2004, OJ 2006L 
257/1-10 (Strikes of Sicilian road transporters; para. 50) and 
Commission Decision of 7 May 2004, OJ 2006 L 257/p. 1-10 
(Agricultural companies had to declare that they would not take 
judicial steps against the striking road transporters in order to 
prevent a double compensation).
38 Commission Decision of 6 June 2002, C (2002) 1674 concerning 
aid measure N 217/2002 in the case of the fireworks disaster 
Enschede. See also Commission Decision of 14 July 2004, OJ 
2006 L 74/49 (Ship wreck Erika; the aid scheme contained an 
adequate procedure to prevent overcompensation; para. 61).
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compensating for the damage. This also applies to 
indirect forms of damage, such as production delays 
because of electricity cuts or difficulties in delivering 
products because of the blockage of certain transport 
routes. These may be compensated up to 100 %, but 
the damage should be assessed at the level of the 
individual firm.39 In some cases, the Commission is 
somewhat lenient in its approach.40
d.  No compensation for normal entrepreneurial 
risks
When a natural disaster or an exceptional occur-
rence causes damage, the Commission will permit 
compensation aid of up to 100 %.41 However, the 
Commission will test critically whether the damage 
that is compensated does not fall within the normal 
entrepreneurial risks of the undertaking. If this is the 
case, the damage should not be compensated. An ex-
ample of normal entrepreneurial costs is the damage 
caused to farmers by animal and plant diseases. The 
Guidelines state that for the companies active in the 
processing and marketing of agricultural products, 
the impact of such diseases on their business must be 
considered a normal business risk. If such companies 
face economic difficulties because of the effects of 
animal or plant diseases, they may be supported via 
rescue and restructuring aid however.42
When assessing which damage represents a nor-
mal entrepreneurial risk, one might look at the extent 
of the damage: damage that is negligible in extent, 
as a rule, will not be eligible for aid. In the decision 
concerning the oil disaster with the ship Erika, the 
French government had even covered turnover losses 
of 2.7 %. The Commission considered that small-scale 
losses must be categorized as costs to be borne by 
undertakings in the normal course of their activity. 
Any economic activity is subject to a variety of great-
er and lesser risks (price fluctuation of production 
factors, fluctuation of the sales price of production, 
possible increase in charges, etc.) resulting from a 
variety of unforeseen circumstances. The Commis-
sion considers that when such risks lead to small-
scale losses, they cannot give rise to an entitlement to 
compensation because that would mean that traders 
could claim compensation whenever they suffered 
the impact of any unforeseen event. 43 In line with 
this general approach, the Commission considers 
that in the agriculture sector, losses must exceed a 
threshold of 30 % (20 % in less-favoured areas) for aid 
to be deemed compatible with the common market 
under Article 107(2)(b) of the Treaty.44 The fact is 
that the Commission does not hesitate to assess the 
apparent ‘abnormality’ of the damage critically – the 
Commission has the last word in this matter, not the 
Member State.
e. Prohibition of overcompensation
The eligible aid should be proportionate to the dam-
age suffered. In many decisions, the Commission 
tests primarily whether or not the Member State has 
overcompensated. The question is, however, wheth-
er the prohibition of overcompensation is a substan-
tive criterion in assessing the compatibility of the 
aid granted with the internal market. One can also 
say that compensating damage in spite of the criteria 
mentioned above will lead automatically to overcom-
pensation. The prohibition of overcompensation is 
hence linked intrinsically to the criteria discussed 
above. For example, the compensation of damage not 
linked directly to an exceptional occurrence might 
lead to overcompensation.45 The same thing can be 
said when the damage is apparently not assessed in 
an objective manner.46 The prohibition of overcom-
pensation therefore does not simply mean that the 
Member State should not compensate more than the 
damage suffered. When aid is given for costs belong-
ing to the normal entrepreneurial risks, to indirect 
39 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004, OJ 2005 L 100/46 
(Natural disasters Italy 2002, para. 46).
40 Commission Decision of 14 July 2004, OJ 2005 L 74/49 (Erika; 
para. 75). A more lenient approach by the Commission can be 
found in the Decision of 9 July 2003, OJ 2004 L 31/1-20 (Natural 
disasters Italy until 1999, paras. 64-65). In this decision, 
concerning the damage after the wreck of the ship Erika, the 
Commission found France’s method of assessing the damage 
acceptable since it was reasonable to use it to facilitate 
administration given the large area and the number of 
undertakings affected by the events.
41 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/C 319/01), para. 123.
42 Ibid., para. 132(e).
43 Commission Decision of 14 July 2004, OJ 2005 L 74/49 (paras. 
71-72).
44 Guidelines, para. 125(b).
45 See Commission Decision of 14 July 2004, OJ 2005 L 74/49, 
para. 35.
46 Commission Decision of 9 July 2003, OJ 2004 L 31/1-20 (Natural 
disasters Italy until 1999, para. 65): the loss was not assessed at 
the level of the individual company, which could lead to an 
inexact assessment of the actual damage, which in turn meant 
that there was a risk of overcompensation.
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damage, or to damage not assessed in an individual 
and objective manner, there is a real risk of overcom-
pensation.
2.  Compensations Falling Within the 
Scope of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU
Article 107(3)(c) is also important for the subject-mat-
ter of this article, since the Commission sometimes 
finds a measure compatible with the State aid rules, 
despite the fact that a natural disaster or an excep-
tional occurrence did not cause the damage. Adverse 
weather conditions (frost, hail, rain, or drought), for 
example, in general do not qualify as an exceptional 
occurrence, but when these conditions cause compa-
nies to suffer major damage, the Commission might 
approve of these contributions by applying Article 
107(3)(c). When an aid measure cannot be approved 
under 107(2)(b), this does not mean necessarily that 
the aid is prohibited. The Commission will ex officio 
consider whether the aid granted might be allowed 
since another exception to the prohibition of State 
aid applies.47 One of those exceptions is laid down in 
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. This article states that aid to 
facilitate the development of certain economic activ-
ities or of certain economic areas may be compatible 
with the internal market, where such aid does not 
affect trading conditions adversely to an extent con-
trary to the common interest. Whether the aid affects 
trading conditions adversely will largely be depend-
ent on the policy of the Commission formulated in 
different guidelines. Since this policy is too exten-
sive to discuss, I will mention an example that might 
illustrate how compensations might be compatible 
with the internal market under this paragraph. The 
example concerns the compensations given to under-
takings for damage resulting from adverse weather 
conditions.
As noted, the Commission generally does not qual-
ify adverse weather conditions such as frost, rain, 
drought, or hail, as natural disasters. When events 
such as these cause significant damage to the agricul-
tural production or means of production, aid might 
be compatible with the State aid rules. For this to be 
the case, the Commission will fall back on the poli-
cy formulated in the Guidelines for State aid in the 
agriculture and forestry sector and the SME regula-
tion.48 A study of these regulations indicates that the 
criteria that the Commission uses to test the compati-
bility of aid under Article 107(2) also apply under the 
third paragraph. The SME regulation, for example, 
states that the maximum amount of loss eligible for 
aid should be reduced by any amount received under 
insurance schemes (prohibition of accumulation) and 
by costs not incurred by the adverse climactic event 
(direct causal link). Furthermore, the calculation of 
loss must be made at the level of the individual hold-
ing (individual assessment).49 The SME regulation 
and the Community Guidelines also contain further, 
more specific conditions. In recent years, an impor-
tant goal of EU policy in this field was to stimulate 
farmers as much as possible to arrange insurance 
for the damages caused by bad weather. As a result, 
from 1 January 2010, the compensation offered must 
be reduced by 50 % unless given to farmers who have 
taken out insurance covering at least 50 % of their 
average annual production or production-related 
income and the statistically most frequent climatic 
risks in the Member State or region concerned.50
III.  The Relation between Legally 
Obligatory Compensations  
and the Prohibition of State Aid
1.  Mandatory Damages in Relation  
to Government Acts Are Compatible 
with the State Aid Rules
Damages that Member States are obliged to pay will 
not qualify as State aid. This follows from the Asteris 
decision of the ECJ. This case began after technical 
errors had been included in a regulation, resulting 
in the non-payment of aid to which Greek tomato 
concentrate producers were entitled. The Greek judge 
47 See, for example, Commission Decision of 20 October 2004, OJ 
2005 L 100/46, paras. 39-41, Commission Decision of 13 June 
2000, OJ 2005 L 263/17 e. v. (Transport of Irish cattle, paras. 
102-104 (ex officio testing to Article 107 lid 3 sub c EG)) and 
Commission Decision of 9 July 2003, OJ 2004 L 31/1-20 (Natural 
disasters Italy, paras. 50-54).
48 Community Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/c 319/01) OJ 2006 C 319/1; and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 
2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to 
State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the 
production of agricultural products and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 70/2001 OJ 2006 L 358/3-21.
49 Articles 10 and 11 of the SME Regulation. See also the 
Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013 (2006/c 319/01), paras. 124 et seq.
50 Article 11 para. 8 SME Regulation and para. 125 sub e of the 
guidelines, mentioned in the previous footnote.
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posed a prejudicial question, asking whether the com-
pensation of damage would be compatible with State 
aid rules and if such compensation should be notified 
to the Commission. The ECJ ruled that the prohibi-
tion of State aid laid down in the EEC Treaty ‘covers 
all aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources to undertakings (…) and therefore concerns 
State interventions which might have the effect of 
distorting the normal conditions of trade between 
Member States (…).’ It follows, the Court continued:
 that State aid, that is to say measures of the pub-
lic authorities favouring certain undertakings or 
certain products, is fundamentally different in its 
legal nature from damages which the competent 
national authorities may be ordered to pay to indi-
viduals in compensation for the damage they have 
caused to those individuals.51
In a recent decision, the GC confirmed the Asteris de-
cision and made clear that this rule also applies when 
the compensation is granted because of a breach of 
the fundamental right to property.52 Although it is 
hard to disagree with this, it is doubtful whether a 
sharp demarcation between State aid and govern-
ment compensation can always be made, as will be 
discussed in part IV.
To obtain a clear view of the relationship between 
compensation and State aid law, one should note the 
decisions the Commission has taken on this issue. 
In the Akzo Nobel case, the Commission specified 
the conditions that a compensation has to fulfil to 
be compatible with State aid rules. This decision is 
also important since the Commission made clear that 
the Asteris rule also applies when the State liability 
is grounded on no-fault liability. The aid measure in-
volved a ‘subsidy’ (that the Commission also referred 
to as a ‘compensation’) given to the chemical com-
pany Akzo Nobel because of the (lawful) repeal of 
an environmental permit for a chlorine plant. This 
repeal caused the plant to be moved to another city, 
diminishing risky transports of the highly dangerous 
chlorine. The Dutch government offered the plant 
compensation of 80 % of the damage it suffered 
because of the forced displacement (divestments, 
moving, and housing costs), amounting to € 31.68 
million. The question arose as to whether such a large 
sum was compatible with State aid rules. The Com-
mission concluded that the compensation was indeed 
compatible:
 A compensation will normally not selectively ben-
efit an individual undertaking, as long as the com-
pensation only serves to compensate the damage 
caused by the government action, and where the 
compensation is the direct result of this action and 
is assessed on the basis of a general compensation 
regulation which is directly linked to the right to 
property, as protected by the constitution and as 
recognized by the national courts.53
This decision clearly exemplifies what the Court of 
Justice meant when stating that compensations differ 
fundamentally from State aid. When government is 
legally bound to pay compensation, it does not aim at 
‘favouring’ an individual undertaking as opposed to 
its competitors. The only aim is to offer an apt rem-
edy for a wrongness incurred on this undertaking, 
or to offer some kind of compensation in situations 
of extreme hardship. A legally obligatory compensa-
tion is therefore primarily compensatory in charac-
ter. This does not mean, however, that compensation 
might not serve other goals. In Dutch environmental 
law, for example, the granting of compensation is 
sometimes motivated by the wish of the authorities 
to facilitate the acceptance of unwelcome and more 
stringent environmental policy. The pursuing of such 
side goals does not mean per se that State aid is grant-
ed. Still, it is important to realize that where such 
not strictly compensatory goals clearly influence the 
amount of the compensation, there might be a risk 
of granting State aid.
This leads us to an important indicator of the com-
pensatory character of damages, namely the extent of 
the compensation. Liability rules generally warrant 
that the damaged individual is not better off after 
receiving compensation. An established legal rule 
is the principle of restitutio in integrum: damages 
51 Joined cases 106 to 120/87, Asteris AE and others v. Hellenic 
Republic and European Economic Community [1988], ECR 5515, 
para. 23. See also C. Quigley, European State Aid Law (Hart 
Publishing 2009), p. 31.
52 Case T-62/08, ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni SpA v. 
European Commission [2010], OJ C 221/37. An application of the 
Asteris rule can also be found in Commission Decision 9 March 
2010, OJ L 118/45, 2010 (Farm Dairy, para. 88). The judgment of 
the GC has been confirmed by the ECJ (joined cases C-448/10 P 
– C-450/10 P, ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni SpA (C-448/10 
P), Cementir Italia Srl (C-449/10 P) and Nuova Terni Industrie 
Chimiche SpA (C-450/10 P) v Commission), n. y. r. Where the 
matter of the compensation is concerned, especially the 
Commission Decision and the GC judgment are of relevance.
53 Commission Decision 16 June 2004, on aid to Akzo Nobel, 
C(2004) 2026fin. See also Commission Decision 20 December 
2006, on aid to car dismantling company Steenbergen, C(2006) 
6608def.
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serve to bring the damaged individual back to his 
situation prior to the damaging act, as if the latter 
had not occurred. When this principle is respected, 
the Commission will normally not qualify the aid 
measure as State aid. The Commission thus stated in 
its decision concerning the German Indemnification 
and Compensation Act, which allowed for compa-
nies to buy land at lowered prices, that this law did 
not constitute State aid:
 (…) in so far as the measures represent only com-
pensation for expropriation or intervention of 
equivalent effect by the State authorities, and the 
benefits awarded are equal to, or less than the fi-
nancial loss caused by such State intervention.54
In cases of no-fault liability, only disproportionate 
damages should be compensated. The principle of 
equality before the public burdens – and likewise 
its German counterpart, the principle of Sonderop-
fer55 – does not rely on the principle of ‘restitutio in 
integrum’. It is clear that this, in principle, guarantees 
that the damaged person will not be put in a better 
position than he or she was before the damaging act 
occurred.
2. Comments on the Asteris Case Law
The Asteris case law and Commission decisions, such 
as in the Akzo Nobel case, offer a solid base for judg-
ing whether a compensation is compatible with State 
aid rules. Yet, they do not completely align with each 
other and raise questions as to how they fit in with 
national liability systems.
A first important point is that the Asteris judg-
ment demands for a national court to have judged 
that a legal obligation to compensate exists. The Akzo 
Nobel decision, on the other hand, states that any 
judicial involvement can be limited to the situation 
where a regulation is applied, as long as this regula-
tion reflects a general legal principle that has been 
recognized by the national courts. The Commission 
thereby brings about an important nuance to the As-
teris decision. While it is true that in most Member 
States the national courts have the last word on this 
matter, one might wonder whether this is a limited 
perspective. In the Netherlands and in France, to 
name but two Member States, it is common for the 
national authorities to decide whether an obligation 
to compensate exists. This applies to claims concern-
ing unlawful and lawful government actions. By de-
manding that the individual who has suffered dam-
ages first addresses his or her claim to the competent 
authority, an amicable settlement might be arranged; 
furthermore, this procedure has the function of put-
ting the case in order and getting all the facts straight 
before the judge is addressed.56 Only when the indi-
vidual who has suffered damages is not satisfied with 
the ‘damage decision’ will he or she be able to contest 
this decision before the courts. This practice shows 
that it is not always necessary for a national court to 
intervene in government liability cases for a liability 
claim to succeed. Although the Asteris decision does 
not refer to this practice, it is in line with the ration-
ale of this decision that compensations granted by 
national authorities are, in essence, an application 
of a general legal obligation to compensate damages, 
and are compatible with State aid rules.57
Second, the question arises whether the decision 
to compensate should, at all times, be based on a writ-
ten regulation, as implied by the Akzo Nobel decision, 
which refers to a ‘general compensation regulation’. 
Again, in most situations, the question as to whether 
a legal obligation to pay damages exists will involve 
the application of some kind of written regulation. 
In the end, State liability comes down to spending 
public funds, which as a rule requires some kind of 
legal basis. It is important to note, however, that a 
legal obligation to pay damages is sometimes based 
on unwritten law. In France and the Netherlands, no-
fault liability on the basis of the equality principle 
was developed by administrative courts, largely inde-
pendent of any statute or other written source of law. 
The further development of the equality doctrine has 
been a mixed affair in both countries: sometimes, 
this principle is reflected in a regulation that applies 
to a specific situation.58 When a regulation is absent, 
54 Commission Decision of 20 January 1999 on the acquisition of 
land under the German Indemnification and Compensation Act 
(notified under document number C(1999) 42).
55 This can be translated as an ‘exceptional sacrifice’ made in the 
general interest.
56 In Dutch law, this decision is called the administrative decision on 
paying damages (zelfstandig schadebesluit). French administrative 
law in liability cases also uses this concept: see on the ‘décision 
préalable’ J. Rivero & J. Waline, Droit administratif, Paris: Dalloz 
2006, p. 570.
57 Implicitly, this can also be deduced from the Akzo Nobel 
decision, which concerned a legal obligation to pay damages, 
which was assessed by a national authority (the Ministry of 
Environmental Affairs).
58 For example, the French Code de l’urbanisme and its Dutch 
counterpart, the Wet op de ruimtelijke ordening.
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a legal obligation to compensate can still exist, in 
which case the party that has suffered damages will 
have to address the public authority and (optionally) 
the administrative or civil courts. Whether a regula-
tion exists or not, in principle, does not make a dif-
ference as to when a legal obligation exists, since the 
same conditions apply. In conclusion, it is important 
to note that a legal obligation to compensate can ex-
ist, even in the absence of a statute.
Lastly, the Akzo Nobel decision raises the question 
of the interpretation of the provision according to 
which the compensation should be based on a com-
pensation regulation ‘which is directly linked to the 
right to property, as protected by the constitution’. 
Again, it is a question of whether or not this approach 
is too narrow. It is clear that this phrase covers situa-
tions of expropriation of land and comparable viola-
tions of property rights, such as the nationalization 
of companies. Furthermore, the German concept of 
a Sonderopfer has a strong link to the right to prop-
erty, as protected by Article 14 of the German Con-
stitution. Looking at other Member States, it is clear 
that a breach of the right to property cannot always 
explain compensation regulations. It can even be said 
that the concept of equality before public burdens 
owes its existence to the will of the legislature and/
or the national courts to offer more protection than 
the right to property can offer. In other words, even 
in the absence of a breach of the right to property, a 
legal obligation to compensate for damages can exist: 
the equality principle does not focus on the question 
whether the right to property is violated but on cer-
tain qualities of the damage, which have to be both 
special and abnormal.59
So far, the EU courts have not ruled on the ques-
tion whether decisions to compensate for damage 
under this regime are compatible with State aid, but 
it is highly likely that they would answer this ques-
tion affirmatively.60 This would seem logical, since 
the equality principle is rooted in the law of several 
Member States. Furthermore, the threshold offered 
by the criteria of special and abnormal events is quite 
high, so that equality-based compensations can only 
be obtained normally by persons and companies that 
have suffered very grave and individual damage. By 
staying within the limits of this strict case law, the 
compensatory character of the damages is not in 
question and the Commission need not be notified 
of compensations given on this basis.
In conclusion, a damage compensation has to meet 
four conditions to be compatible with State aid rules.
1. The compensation has to be based on a general 
rule of law, be it in the form of a regulation that 
provides for a right to damage compensation, or 
as an unwritten principle of law, as recognized by 
national courts. The foundation of the right to com-
pensation in law guarantees that every individual 
company can invoke this rule equally, so that it is 
indubitable that the compensation might provide 
for selective benefits for certain groups in society.
2. This general rule of law should be an expression 
of a legal obligation for damages. Among those 
rules are, in any case, the obligation to compensate 
after unlawful government action and the right 
to compensation in the case of violations of the 
right to property, which cover both the deprivation 
of property (cases of expropriation, for example) 
and the regulation of property (the revocation of a 
permit, for example); Article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the ECHR protects both situations. Lastly, com-
pensations based on no-fault liability, which are 
generally based on the equality principle or com-
parable concepts (such as the German Sonderop-
fer) as a rule will also be compatible with State 
aid law. When compensating on these grounds, 
the compensatory character of the compensation 
is not debatable.
3. There has to be a clear and direct link between the 
damaging government act and the right to com-
pensation. When this is not the case, there is a 
presumption that the government did not actually 
want to fulfil its legal obligations, but wanted to 
pursue other policy-related goals.
4. When granting compensation, the benefits award-
ed must be equal or inferior to the financial loss 
59 The fact that the liability regime based on violations of the right to 
property can and should be distinguished from the violation of 
the equality principle also follows from the FIAMM judgment of 
the ECJ. In this decision, the ECJ stipulated that Community law 
currently does not recognize the possibility of no-fault liability 
based on the breach of the right to equality. Only when the right 
of property is infringed upon, or when Community institutions 
have acted unlawfully, can the Community be held liable (Article 
340 TFEU).
60 As stated, the Akzo Nobel decision might be considered as an 
application of the equality principle by the Dutch government. 
One can also take note of the Commission Decision of 8 
December 1999 on the measure which the Netherlands intends 
to implement concerning rationalization of pig assembly centres 
(notified under document number C(1999) 5209) OJ 2000 L 
144/28-34. In this decision, the Commission ruled that the Dutch 
authorities ‘indirectly confirm that there is a legal obligation to 
make provision for transitional measures or compensation 
arrangements.’ The aid measure was held compatible with the 
internal market.
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caused by such State interventions. At all times, 
overcompensation should be avoided. This is guar-
anteed sufficiently when the conditions mentioned 
under 1, 2, and 3 are respected. However, there is a 
danger of overcompensation when more damage 
is compensated than was suffered (through dif-
ferent sources of compensation, for example) or 
when compensation is given for damages that fall 
within the normal business risks.
IV.  When Do Mandatory Damages 
Amount to Unlawful State Aid?
In the previous paragraph, I aimed to give a rough 
outline of the conditions that damage compensations 
must fulfil to fall outside the scope of State aid law. 
When applying these basic rules, a discussion might 
arise, since vagueness surrounds the conditions men-
tioned. For example, when is a causal link sufficiently 
direct? How should the exact amount of damage be 
assessed? Which types of damage and costs belong 
to the ‘normal risks inherent in trading’? A Dutch 
author once described the position of public author-
ities as a prisoner’s dilemma: will they be in viola-
tion of the European Convention for Human Rights 
(by violating the fundamental right to property) or 
the TFEU (by granting too much compensation and 
breaching State aid law)?61 Although it seems that 
public authorities in general know how to use their 
latitude in a legally responsible way, the risk of grant-
ing State aid is often present. In this paragraph, I will 
discuss situations in which questions such as these 
arose to illustrate how financial means that claim to 
be compensatory in character can qualify as State 
aid.
1.  Serving More Goals than Mere 
Compensation
As stated, the compensatory character of damages 
is of fundamental importance for the question if 
they fall within the scope of the State aid rules. An 
important indicator therefore might be the question 
whether the damages aim at doing something more 
than merely offering compensation. It should be not-
ed that the serving of policy goals is a common side 
effect of government compensations. For example, 
when combating a contagious disease among ani-
mals, it is of prime importance to trace the possi-
ble sources of the disease as soon as possible. The 
high thresholds for liability in this field can hinder 
reaching this goal. In the case concerning Booker 
Aquaculture, the ECJ stressed that, in general, each 
individual must bear the damage he or she has suf-
fered personally and that losses due to disease or 
suspected disease, in principle, are normal farming 
risks.62 A possible effect might be that producers are 
not tempted to slaughter their animals and will take 
the risk that meat from those calves enters the food 
chain untraced. When producers know that they will 
be compensated for combating measures that affect 
their livestock, they will be more willing to notify the 
public authorities that an outbreak has possibly taken 
place. This facilitates considerably the combating of 
contagious diseases.63
The field of agriculture and the outbreak of conta-
gious diseases have their own special rules that spec-
ify which costs and damages can be compensated. 
Public authorities, therefore, to a certain extent, can 
compensate to a higher degree than the boundaries 
set by the law concerning government liability.64 
There are limits, however, to compensating specific 
groups of undertakings and purposely offering more 
than that required by law. The case concerning the 
common guidelines for the use of economic develop-
ment funds by the Land of Berlin can illustrate this. 
The Land of Berlin was planning to carry out public 
measures (construction work, the release of land, and 
other urban planning and development measures) to 
correct the urban development that had arisen since 
the division of Berlin. The public measures, in some 
cases, could mean that businesses would have to be 
relocated or that substantial building alterations to 
their premises had to be made. The Guidelines’ aim 
was to ensure that firms would not be forced by the 
public measures to close down their business in Ber-
61 Daalder, Het tweesnijdend zwaard van Vrouwe Justitia, 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht 6/2006, p. 26.
62 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture v. The 
Scottish Ministers [2001], p. I-7411. The ECJ stated that ‘the 
petitioners (…) can expect, as farmers, that a fish disease may 
break out at any moment and cause them loss. Such risk is 
inherent in the business of raising and selling livestock and is the 
consequence of a natural occurrence, so far as both List I and II 
diseases are concerned’ (para. 83).
63 See also the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-428/99, H. van den 
Bor BV v. Voedselvoorzieningsin-en verkoopbureau [2001], 
para. 32.
64 See, in particular, the conditions mentioned in the Community 
guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 
to 2013 (2006/C 319/01), para. 16.
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lin or to leave the city. Therefore, all kinds of costs in 
a direct relation to the public measures were eligible 
under the scheme: costs of dismantling and setting 
up operating equipment and fixtures again, costs of 
preparing replacement premises, and costs incurred 
because previous operating equipment and/or fix-
tures could no longer be used. Under the common 
compensation regime in the Building Code, these 
costs could not be compensated. Germany claimed 
that the Guidelines thus had to fill the ‘gap’ in Ger-
many’s legal system, and that the payments merely 
filled in what was ‘forgotten’ by the Building Code 
by private law. The common guidelines supposedly 
did nothing more than place the affected Berlin firms 
on an equal footing with others not affected by the 
public measures.
The Commission focused on the compensatory 
character of the aid measure. It pointed out that fed-
eral legislation and private law already provided the 
compensation for damages following from lawful 
public measures. The Commission’s view that an ad-
vantage was conferred on the firms concerned by 
the common guidelines was also strengthened by the 
fact that the common guidelines made the payment 
by the State conditional on the firms relocating with-
in Berlin. The Commission concluded:
This makes it clear that the aim of the common 
guidelines is to confer an advantage on certain firms 
to which other firms are not entitled, even though 
they are all affected by the same measures. The real 
purpose of the common guidelines is thus not con-
fined to merely compensating for a disadvantage. 
Instead, as a clear regional policy tool, their purpose 
is to keep firms in Berlin.65
According to the Commission, the Berlin Guide-
lines were incompatible with the internal market. 
The same line of argumentation can be recognized in 
the recent case of ThyssenKrupp. Again, the authori-
ties stretched the existing rules on compensation so 
far that the courts could only conclude that Italy was 
in breach of the State aid rules. In this case, the Ital-
ian authorities offered compensation to the electricity 
companies that were nationalized in 1962. This com-
pensation consisted of the granting of a preferential 
tariff (the ‘Terni tariff’) for the supply of electricity 
for a limited period of time: from 1963 to 1992, Terni 
could obtain electricity against a tariff that was the 
same as the tariff of the self-producers. The compen-
sation therefore was not the traditional compensation 
applied in expropriation cases (which would entail 
the loss of the market value of the assets of the na-
tionalized companies), but concerned operating aid 
– aid intended to relieve an undertaking of the ex-
penses that it would normally bear in its day-to-day 
management or its usual activities. It is settled case 
law that such aid, in principle, distorts competition 
to an extent contrary to the common interest in the 
sectors in which it is granted.66
When Italy adopted a new national energy plan in 
1991, a law was adopted that extended the existing 
concessions to 2001. Under this law, the preferential 
tariff was extended to 2001 as well. This law did con-
tain a clause that provided for the phasing out of this 
tariff between 2001 and 2007. The Commission was 
notified of this law, and it decided that parts of it 
contained unlawful State aid, but held that the com-
pensation clause was compatible with the State aid 
rules. In 2005, however, Italy decided to interrupt the 
phasing out of the tariff and to extend the preferen-
tial tariff to 2010. Italy stated that the extension was 
a necessary and compulsory compensation for the 
damage caused by the nationalization of 1962. At the 
same time, Italy claimed that the reasons behind the 
extension were political in nature: Italy feared that 
the disruption of the preferential tariff might dis-
rupt competition between the Terni companies and 
comparable companies abroad, who, as Italy claimed, 
could profit by lower energy prices. Putting an end to 
the preferential tariff might lead to an outplacement 
of the activities of the self-producers outside of the 
European Union, causing a major industrial crisis 
and a large-scale loss of employment.67
As was the case in the Berlin Guidelines case, the 
Commission and the GC took notice of the Italian 
law governing the compensation regime in cases like 
this. In the original decision to nationalize the Terni 
Company, the national legislature chose a specific 
date for the expiry of the Terni tariff, without any 
other temporal indication in Decree No 1165/63. The 
applicant had not established that the parliamentary 
documents revealed a wish by the legislature to align 
the duration of application of the Terni tariff with 
that of the self-producers’ hydroelectric concessions, 
in that the renewal of the latter was to entail automat-
65 Commission Decision of 24 June 2003 concerning the aid scheme 
‘Common guidelines for the use of economic development funds 
by the Land of Berlin’ OJ 2004 L 43/88.
66 Case C-86/89, Italy v. Commission [1990] ECR I-3891, para. 18, 
and Case C-301/87, France v. Commission [1990] ECR-307, 
para. 50.
67 Commission Decision of 20 November 2007, OJ 2008 L 144/37, 
para. 61.
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ic extension of that tariff (as Italy stated). This paral-
lelism in treatment with those hydropower producers 
who had seen their concessions renewed, according 
to the Commission, lay ‘at the heart of the compensa-
tory mechanism.’68 This parallel treatment, however, 
was foreseen in the expropriation arrangement only 
for 30 years, not indefinitely. The GC stated that there 
is no ‘rule, principle of Community law, provision 
of national law or decision of a national court on 
which to base its interpretation, which would lead 
to the grant of compensation for an indefinite pe-
riod or providing more generally for the possibility 
of taking account of events subsequent to the fixing 
of the compensation in order to alter the estimate 
of the nationalized or expropriated asset and, there-
fore, the scope of the compensation.’69 According to 
the Commission, ‘compensation for an expropriation 
cannot consist in an open-ended arrangement, but 
must be clearly and predictably established at the 
time of the expropriation, subject to the possibility 
for the expropriated company to challenge the pro-
posed amount.’70
These cases show that where authorities compen-
sate willingly outside of the existing rules on com-
pensation (as in the Berlin case) or stretch the exist-
ing compensation rules in a manner no longer in a 
sufficiently direct causal link to the government act 
that caused the damage (as in the Italian case), there 
is a risk of acting in violation of the State aid rules. 
Both cases also show that Member States should not 
expect that they dispose of a large margin of appre-
ciation where the assessment of the extent of the 
damage is concerned. On the contrary, the GC opted 
for a very precise study of the original decision to 
nationalize the companies in order to determine the 
exact limits of the legal obligation to compensation. 
‘Labelling’ a financial contribution as legally obliged 
compensation does not guarantee that it is compati-
ble with State aid rules.
2.  Compensation of Normal Business 
Risks
The risk of granting State aid under the guise of 
damage compensation might be even greater when 
the government liability is based on the principle of 
equality before the public burdens. When liability 
based on unlawfulness and liability for expropria-
tions is concerned, amongst the Member States – and 
likewise in the case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR 
– there is a broad consensus on the compensable 
damage and the situations in which liability might 
arise. Such consensus is far from present when the 
liability based on lawful acts is concerned. Many 
Member States do not recognize such a type of lia-
bility and where they do, there is a lack of clarity as 
to the question of when the conditions of ‘specialty’ 
and ‘abnormality’ are fulfilled. This lack of consensus 
was an important factor in the ECJ’s decision not to 
recognize this type of liability under the wings of 
Article 340 TFEU.71
While a study of the case law in the Member 
States that do recognize this type of liability shows 
that the same (high) thresholds apply, it is also true 
that the conditions for liability without fault to exist 
are, to a certain extent, vague. This vagueness cer-
tainly surrounds the criterion of the ‘normal risks 
inherent in business’, which is more or less the same 
as the ‘abnormality’ criterion. Compensation for dam-
ages that result from these risks cannot be award-
ed, since a breach of the equality principle will not 
be established. However, since it is debatable which 
risks can be found ‘normal’, it is not always easy 
to delineate between awarding compensation and 
granting State aid. For example, the changing of the 
conditions under which a permit can be used, as a 
rule, will not lead to government liability. Changing 
the conditions generally belongs to normal societal 
or entrepreneurial risks.72 Dutch owners of cables 
and pipes, however, can claim compensation when 
the conditions of their permits are changed and their 
cables or pipes have to be displaced, depending on 
the number of years that the cables have lain un-
68 Commission Decision of 20 November 2007, OJ 2008 L 144/37, 
para. 92.
69 Case T-62/08, ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni SpA v European 
Commission, OJ 2008 C-221/37, para. 131. See for a comment on 
this case M. Baart and M. K. G. Tjepkema, 
Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen, 2012, p. 27 and Dirk. T. 
Wiemer, Zeitschrift für Beihilfen- und Subventionsrecht, 2011, 
p. 25-39. 
70 Commission Decision of 20 November 2007, OJ 2008 L 144/37, 
para. 74.
71 According to the ECJ, the convergence on the liability for 
unlawful acts existed ‘in no way’ regarding the possible existence 
of a principle of liability in the case of a lawful act or omission of 
the public authorities, in particular where it is of a legislative 
nature (Case C-120/06 P, FIAMM v. Council and Commission 
[2008], ECR I-6513, para. 175 (see also para. 170)).
72 See for French case law Conseil d’Etat 29 May 1985, Actualité 
Juridique Droit Administratif 1985, p. 510 (Société Trans.Union) 
and for a Dutch case ABRvS 28 January 2009, LJN BH1100 
(Revocation Permit Cockle Fishery).
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derground. This compensation regulation73 was the 
result of a political compromise between the owners 
of the pipes and the Dutch government: by offering 
compensation, the authorities prevented a situation 
where the cable and pipe owners would start judicial 
proceedings whenever the Ministry of Waterways 
and Public Works embarked on projects that harmed 
their interests. The criterion of the normal business 
risks was simply set aside, even though there is no 
doubt that the displacement of cables and pipes falls 
within the business risks of the owners.
A Dutch case concerning the prohibition of a me-
chanical cockle fishery provides another example. 
In 2004, the Dutch government decided to stop giv-
ing permits for mechanical cockle fisheries in the 
Wadden Sea. This decision was prompted by more 
stringent European policy on the conservation of 
nature, which entailed that mechanical cockle fish-
eries would only be allowed if the fishery companies 
switched to a more sustainable way of fishing for 
cockles. In the short term, this aim was not feasible, 
so the Dutch government decided to allow for the 
manual fishing of cockles only, thereby ending the 
cockle fishery activities of several companies, who 
claimed that this decision cost them millions of Eu-
ros. The Dutch cabinet decided that compensation 
was due. After a study of the different legal grounds 
that applied in this case, the Dutch government saw 
it as a legal obligation to pay the cockle fishing com-
panies €92 million.
The cockle fishery case did prompt a fierce debate 
in the Dutch literature on the question of whether 
the damage compensation was legally mandatory 
or whether the Dutch government (also) wanted to 
appease the cockle sector, which had fished in the 
Wadden Sea for decades and now had to end its ac-
tivities. The debate in the literature revolved mainly 
around the question of whether the cockle companies 
could have foreseen the decision to stop granting per-
mits. It follows from Dutch damage compensation 
law that foreseeable damages in general do not have 
to be compensated at all or only partly; in the Ber-
lin Guidelines case, the European Commission also 
mentioned this criterion.74 The rationale is that good 
entrepreneurship also means that companies prepare 
themselves for foreseeable damages, taking decisions 
to mitigate the damaging consequences.
Was it in anyway foreseeable that the government 
would no longer grant permits for mechanical cockle 
fisheries? Some authors claimed that in this case too, 
the decision was unforeseeable. For years, the cockle 
companies had been given permits, thus leading to 
the legitimate expectation that this would not stop 
suddenly. Furthermore, while it might have been 
foreseeable that cockle fisheries would be allowed 
under more stringent conditions, it could not be said 
that a total ban was foreseeable. Previous limitations 
on cockle fisheries were only temporary and not in-
definite.75 Other authors argued that a total ban was 
foreseeable.76 Since 1981, the Wadden Sea had been 
designated as a natural monument, and since 1991, 
had been a special protection area based on the Birds 
Directive, which meant that all activities with sig-
nificantly dangerous consequences for the natural 
values of the area concerned were, in principle, pro-
hibited. Furthermore, in the surrounding countries 
(Denmark and Germany), a total ban on mechanical 
cockle fisheries had been imposed at the start of the 
1990s, making it hard to believe that a total ban in 
the Wadden Sea could have come as a surprise. This 
also means that the expectation of obtaining a new 
permit under the same conditions could hardly be 
called legitimate: under the circumstances, the re-
newal of their permits had become more improbable 
over the years. Lastly, the Dutch case law on the com-
pensation of individuals who are dependent on natu-
ral resources and who operate their businesses in an 
environment that is subjected to stringent govern-
ment regulations – largely dictated by EC policy and 
legislation – is very strict.77 A reasonable and careful 
entrepreneur has to take into account that decisions, 
even very stringent ones, can be taken when they 
operate within an environment that is vulnerable. 
It was not up for debate that the mechanical cockle 
fishery was under strict European supervision. It is 
conceivable that in the light of the Habitats Direc-
73 The Damage Compensation Regulation Displacement of Cables 
and Pipes within and outside of Waterways and Public Works 
(Nadeelcompensatieregeling Verleggen Kabels en Leidingen in en 
buiten rijkswaterstaatwerken 1999 ).
74 Germany stated that the payments under the common guidelines 
were designed for ‘unforeseeable disadvantages’. The Commission 
noted, however, that damage caused by the termination, 
premature cancellation and discharge of a contract of use are 
risks inherent in business life and are thus foreseeable. It could 
therefore not accept Germany’s argument.
75 Van der Wal & Van Schayk, Financiële compensatie mechanische 
kokkelvisserij: politieke keuze én juridische noodzaak!, Overheid 
& Aansprakelijkheid 2007/1, p. 2-8.
76 See especially Hoitink & Backes, Financiele compensatie 
mechanische kokkelvisserij: politieke keuze of juridische 
noodzaak?, Overheid & Aansprakelijkheid 2006/2, p. 24-30. 
77 See e. g. ABRvS 27 April 2011, L J. N. BQ2653 (Hinderplaat 2007).
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tive, the permits could have been refused in a much 
earlier stage.78
The Commission was not notified of the lump sum 
granted by the Dutch government, so it is not known 
whether the Dutch government acted in violation of 
the State aid rules. If the Commission had judged 
that this was the case, this would have meant that 
the aid, including interest, would have had to be re-
covered from the cockle companies.
V. Concluding Remarks
The relationship between damages and State aid is a 
complex one. At first glance, although the granting of 
damages would seem to be unproblematic in light of 
the State aid rules, Commission decisions, union case 
law, and national practice have shown that public au-
thorities provide regularly for financial contributions 
to firms where it is uncertain that the State aid rules 
have been respected. Authorities should be aware of 
the fact that the Commission and the Courts have 
opted for a restrictive approach to when deciding 
which causes qualify as a natural disaster or an ex-
ceptional occurrence. Furthermore, they tend to opt 
for a precise test of the relevant criteria (sufficiently 
direct causal link, individual and objective assess-
ment of damages, prohibition of overcompensation 
and accumulation). This precise way of testing is also 
recognizable where – other than the exceptions men-
tioned in Articles 107(2)(b) and 107(3)(c) – the State 
can be held liable in court for damages, as paragraph 
V showed. 
This does not mean necessarily that authorities 
cannot make special damage regulations for specific 
groups of undertakings (which suffer from infra-
structural works, for example). Public authorities 
should be careful, however, to provide for the com-
pensation of damages that fall usually within the 
normal business risks, in order to bind undertakings 
to a certain region. Meanwhile, this strict testing of 
damages to the State aid rules can lead to harsh re-
sults for the recipients of the aid. Not only have they 
been confronted with acts which severely harmed 
their interest. When the compensation is qualified 
as unlawful State aid, the same government that 
thought it owed parties a compensation will have to 
retrieve the aid. This is another reason why the pub-
lic authorities should be careful in making ‘instru-
mental’ use of compensation mechanisms.
78 Hotink & Backes 2006.
